Please contact this domain's administrator as their DNS Made Easy services have expired Dec 14, · The first is known as inference to the best explanation. Such inferences generate what is called explanatory coherence (see chapter 7 in Harman ). According to this approach, we must suppose you form a belief about the way the hat appears to you in your perceptual experiences, and a second belief to the effect that your perceptual The New York Review of Books (or NYREV or NYRB) is a semi-monthly magazine with articles on literature, culture, economics, science and current affairs. Published in New York City, it is inspired by the idea that the discussion of important books is an indispensable literary activity
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Just as each of these different translations captures some facet of the meaning of these Greek terms, so too does each translation capture a different facet of epistemology itself. Much recent work in formal epistemology is an attempt to understand how our degrees of confidence are rationally constrained by our evidence, and much recent work in feminist epistemology is an attempt to understand the ways in which interests affect our evidence, and affect our rational constraints more generally.
In all these cases, epistemology seeks to understand one or another kind of cognitive success or, correspondingly, cognitive failure. This entry surveys the varieties of cognitive success, and some recent efforts to understand some of those varieties. There are many different kinds of cognitive success, and they differ from one another along various dimensions.
Exactly what these various kinds of success are, and how they differ from each other, and how they are explanatorily related to each other, and how they can be achieved or obstructed, are all matters of controversy. This section provides some background to these various controversies. Cognitive successes can differ from each other by virtue of qualifying different kinds of things. For instance, a cognitive success—like that of making a discovery—may be the success of a person e.
But some kinds of cognitive success—like that of having successfully cultivated a highly discriminating palate, say—may be the success of a person, and perhaps even of a people, but cannot be the success of a laboratory or of a psychological fragment.
And other kinds of cognitive success—like that of being conclusively established by all the available evidence—may be the success of a theory, but cannot be the success of a person—or like that of being epistemically fruitful—may be the success of a research program, or of a particular proof-strategy, but not of a theory.
Some of the recent controversies concerning the objects of cognitive success concern the metaphysical relations among the cognitive successes of various kinds of objects: Does the cognitive success of a process involve anything over and above the cognitive success of each state in the succession of states that comprise the execution of that process?
And either way, what sorts of doxastic states are there, and with respect to what kinds of possible success are best essay about nutrition rea assessible? Other recent controversies concern the issue of whether it is a metaphysically fundamental feature of the objects of cognitive success that they are, in some sense, supposed to enjoy the kind of cognitive success in question.
For instance, we might think that what it is for some group of people to constitute a laboratory is that the group is, in some sense, supposed to make discoveries of a certain kind: that is the point of bringing that group into collaboration in a particular way, even if the individuals are spread out across different continents and their funding sources diverse. But even if a laboratory is plausibly characterized by a norm to which it is answerable, is something analogous true of the other objects that can enjoy cognitive success?
Is it, for instance, best essay about nutrition rea, a metaphysically fundamental feature of a belief that it is, in some sense, supposed to be knowledge?
Is it, for instance, a metaphysically fundamental feature of a person that such a creature is, in some sense, supposed to be rational? Similar disputes arise for the other objects of cognitive success: to what extent can we understand what these objects are without appeal to the kinds of success that they are supposed to enjoy?
If so, then how is it good? Or is it rather that their enjoyment of that success is required? If so, then best essay about nutrition rea requires it, and why? We turn to that general topic next. Some kinds of cognitive success involve compliance with a constraintwhile others involve the realization or promotion of values. We can contrast these two kinds of success by contrasting the associated kinds of failure: failure to comply with a constraint results in impermissibilitywhereas failure to realize some values results in sub-optimality.
But it is implausible to regard all sub-optimality as epistemically impermissible: cognitive success does not require us to be perfectly cognitively optimal in every way. If cognitive success is ever achievable even in principle, then at least some degree of cognitive sub-optimality must be permissible.
If such supererogation is possible, best essay about nutrition rea least in principle, then the permissible can fall short of the optimal. Best essay about nutrition rea controversies concern not merely the relation between permissibility and optimality, but also the metaphysical basis of each kind of success. In virtue of what is some state, or act, or process, or relation, epistemically permissible? And in virtue of what is it optimal to whatever degree it is?
Epistemic consequentialists take the answer to the former question to be determined by appeal to the answer to the latter. Another prominent controversy is carried on among consequentialists themselves, and concerns the question of best essay about nutrition rea values are such that their realization or promotion constitutes optimality.
Of course, best essay about nutrition rea, as a matter of deontic logic, what is permissible must include at least what is required: for a condition to be required is simply for the complement of that condition to not be permissible. But this leaves it open whether, in a particular domain, what is permissible includes more than what is required.
Permissivists argue that it does see Schoenfield for a defense of permissivismbest essay about nutrition rea anti-permissivists argue that it does not see White and Schultheis for arguments against permissivism. A philosopher who thinks that the range of permissible credences is no wider than the range of required credences is best essay about nutrition rea anti-permissivist—but an anti-permissivist view, so understood, is consistent with the claim that the credences we are required to have are not point-valued but are rather interval-valued.
Such a philosopher could, for instance, best essay about nutrition rea, claim that there is only one credence that you are permitted to assign to the proposition that the cat is on the mat, best essay about nutrition rea this required credence is neither, best essay about nutrition rea. Nonetheless, if q is obviously false, then perhaps I ought not both believe that p is true and also believe that if p is true then q is true.
On one side of this distinction are those kinds of cognitive success that qualify particular objects, e. In each case, some object enjoys a particular cognitive success, and this success obtains by virtue of various features of that object: the features in question may be intrinsic or relational, synchronic or diachronic, biological or phenomenological, etc. On the other side of this distinction are those kinds of cognitive success that qualify the relations between various things, each of which is itself individually assessable for cognitive success: e.
In each case, a particular cognitive success qualifies the relations among various objects, quite independently of whether any particular one of those objects itself enjoys substantive cognitive success. Some epistemologists have attempted to reduce substantive successes of a particular kind to structural successes.
And still others have denied that any such reduction is possible in either direction see, for instance, Worsnip and Neta In recent years, this controversy has been most active in connection with rational permissibility of beliefs, or of credences. Many epistemologists attempt to explain one kind of cognitive success in terms of other kinds. For instance, Chisholm tries to explain all cognitive success notions in terms of just one primitive notion: that of one attitude being more reasonable than another, for an agent at a time see Chisholm Williamson, in contrast, treats knowledge of facts as an explanatory primitive, and suggests that other kinds of cognitive success be explained in terms of such knowledge see Williamson Several prominent philosophers treat the notion of a normative reason as primitive see Scanlon And so on.
In each case, what is at issue is which kinds of cognitive success are explicable in terms of which other kinds of cognitive success. Of course, whether this issue is framed as an issue concerning the explication of some concepts in terms of other conceptsor in terms of the grounding of some properties by other propertiesor in some other terms still, depends on the metaphilosophical commitments of best essay about nutrition rea framing the issue.
The issue of which kinds of cognitive success explain which other kinds of cognitive success is orthogonal to the issue of which particular cognitive successes explain which other particular cognitive successes.
The former issue concerns whether, for instance, best essay about nutrition rea, the property of knowledge is to be explained in terms of the relation of one thing being a reason for another, or whether the relation of being a reason for is to explained in terms of knowledge. But the latter issue concerns whether, for instance, I am justified in holding some particular belief—say, that the cat is on the mat—in virtue of my knowing various specific things, e.
This latter issue is at the heart of various epistemological regress puzzles, and we will return to it below. But those regress puzzles are largely independent of the issue of metaphysical priority being discussed here. What makes it the case that something counts as a form of cognitive success?
Not every cognitive state enjoys cognitive success. Knowing, understanding, mastering—these best essay about nutrition rea cognitive successes. What makes the difference? Recent work on this issue tends to defend one of the following three answers to this question: contractualism, best essay about nutrition rea, consequentialism, or constitutivism.
The contractualist says that a particular cognitive state counts as a kind of success because the practice of so counting it serves certain widely held practical interests.
The consequentialist says that a particular cognitive state counts as a kind of success because it tends to constitute or tends to promote some crucial benefit. According to some consequentialists, the benefit in question is that of having true beliefs and lacking false beliefs see BonJourAudi According to others, it is the benefit of having a comprehensive understanding of reality.
According to others, it is a benefit that is not narrowly epistemic, e, best essay about nutrition rea. Finally, the constitutivist may say that a particular cognitive state counts as a kind of success if it is the constitutive aim of some feature of our lives to achieve that state see Korsgaard for a defense best essay about nutrition rea constitutivism concerning norms of rationality. For instance, the constitutivist might say that knowledge is a kind of cognitive success by virtue of being the constitutive aim of belief, or that understanding is a kind of cognitive success by virtue of being the constitutive aim of reasoning, or that practical wisdom is a kind of cognitive success by virtue of being the constitutive aim of all human activity.
Consider, for instance, the difference between the kind of success involved in having a state that is fitting for instance, holding a belief knowledgeablyand the kind of success involved in having a state that is valuable for instance, holding a belief the holding of which is beneficial. Perhaps the constitutivist can explain the former kind of success better than the consequentialist can, but the consequentialist can explain the latter kind of success better than the constitutivist can.
Of course, if and when the demands of these different kinds of success conflict, the agent will face the question of how to proceed. Much recent work in epistemology has attempted to adjudicate that question, or to interrogate the assumption of possible conflict that gives rise to it see, for instance, MarušićMcCormickand Rinard a and b. These different ways of understanding cognitive success each give rise to a different understanding of the range of ways in which cognitive success can be obstructed, and so best essay about nutrition rea different understanding of the range in which agents may be harmed, best essay about nutrition rea, and sometimes even wronged, by such obstructions.
That is to say, such harms may be done not merely by the specific ways in which we interpret or implement our practice of epistemic appraisal, best essay about nutrition rea, but rather in the fundamental features of that practice itself.
For instance, a practice that grants the status of knowledge to a belief formed on the basis of clearly conceptualized sense perception, but not to a belief formed on the basis of a less clearly conceptualized sense of a personal need, is a practice that systematically discredits beliefs formed by exercises of empathy, relative to beliefs formed in other ordinary ways. In a situation in which false testimony would be an epistemic harm, dishonest testimony would be an epistemic wrong.
But the range of epistemic harms and epistemic wrongs can be much broader than those involving falsehood and deception. Alternatively, I can harm you, best essay about nutrition rea perhaps even wrong you, by getting you to think poorly of your own capacity to grasp a subject by not paying attention to what you think or say. And finally, I can harm you, and perhaps even wrong you, by indoctrinating you in a view so strongly that you lose the ability to consider alternative views.
But some of these harms and wrongs are constituted not by any particular act, but rather by the procedures that give rise to those acts: for instance, when a research program in the life sciences implicitly assumes an ideologically-driven conception of human nature see Longino and Anderson for fascinating case studies. And sometimes, the harms and wrongs might even be built into our practice of epistemic appraisal—perhaps even a tendency that is somehow constitutive of that very practice.
Suppose, for instance, that it is constitutive of our practice of epistemic appraisal to count someone as knowing a fact only if they possess concepts adequate to conceptualize that fact, best essay about nutrition rea.
And so, these same individuals will not be granted the same authority or credibility as other individuals, even when those latter are less cognitively sensitive to the range of facts in question.
Recent work in feminist epistemology has helped us to gain an appreciation of best essay about nutrition rea how widespread this phenomenon is see the seminal discussion of epistemic injustice in M.
Frickerand the development of that account in Dotson Knowledge is among the many kinds of cognitive success that epistemology is interested in understanding. Because it has attracted vastly more attention in recent epistemology than any other variety of cognitive success, we devote the present section to considering it in some detail. Exactly how to individuate the various kinds of cognitive success is not something that can be determined solely by appeal to the lexicon of any particular natural language.
But, despite not having ever known Napoleon, you could still know a great many facts about Napoleon—perhaps you know even more facts about Napoleon than did those who knew him most intimately. This shows that knowing a person is not the same as knowing a great many facts about the person: the latter is not sufficient for the former.
And perhaps the former is not even sufficient for the latter, since I might know my next door neighbor, and yet not realize that he is an undercover agent, and that almost everything he tells best essay about nutrition rea about himself is false. Knowing a person is a matter of being acquainted with that person, and acquaintance involves some kind of perceptual relation to the person, best essay about nutrition rea.
What kind of perceptual relation? Must acquaintance involve an ability to distinguish that individual from others? It depends upon what such an ability amounts to. In his groundbreaking book, The Concept of MindGilbert Ryle argued that knowing how to do something must be different from knowing any set of facts. And, of course, you might know how to swim even without knowing very many facts about swimming.
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Dear Twitpic Community - thank you for all the wonderful photos you have taken over the years. We have now placed Twitpic in an archived state Dec 14, · The first is known as inference to the best explanation. Such inferences generate what is called explanatory coherence (see chapter 7 in Harman ). According to this approach, we must suppose you form a belief about the way the hat appears to you in your perceptual experiences, and a second belief to the effect that your perceptual Please contact this domain's administrator as their DNS Made Easy services have expired
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